independence in three periods

andrej slivnik

Ruptures and continuities

Independence is considered a sacred moment in the birth of Latin American nations. In the case of Brazil, the document intended to serve as the baptismal certificate is undoubtedly the painting Independência ou Morte! [Independence or Death!], by Pedro Américo. The scene portrayed evokes the moment inscribed in the popular imagination as the decisive point of rupture between Brazil and Portugal. The “cry of Ipiranga” will be remembered as a watershed between the old colony and the new independent nation.

But the presence of D. Pedro I, prince regent and son of the king of Portugal, centered in the painting as the main character of the event it portrays, already betrays the fundamental questions to be posed about the process of Brazil’s political emancipation. Compared to the other colonies in Latin America, which became independent in the wake of the same process of fragmentation of the colonial regime, the permanence of the House of Braganza and the maintenance of the territorial unit of the former Portuguese colonial aggregate are noteworthy.

Independence movements are commonly associated with the idea of rupture, but the particular characteristics of the Brazilian case raises important doubts about the continuities and discontinuities of the process of political emancipation, a question that has largely organized the historiographic debate on the subject. ¹ It is evident that the dissolution of the colonial pact, which kept Brazil tied to Portugal for three centuries, represented substantive changes, but perhaps less striking transformations than would be imagined by the unsuspecting spectator of Pedro Américo’s reverberant canvas.

The cry “Independence or Death!”, likely the fruit of the nineteenth-century nationalist imagination, would have sounded out from the throats of those who knew they would not die. This, by the way, is considered by Caio Prado Jr. as the only advantage among the peculiarities of the emancipatory process conducted around the figure of the prince regent. The condition of Brazil as the provisional seat of the monarchy, with the transfer of the Court in 1808, would have been the immediate cause of Independence, replacing a movement that had been resolved in the rest of Latin America through armed struggle. ² An apparently peaceful and essentially conservative political transition conducted between crowned heads of the same royal house to maintain Portuguese interests already vested in Brazil. ³

From the economic point of view, political independence and the end of the mercantilist colonial pact, which had defined the Old Colonial System, made space for a different kind of dependency by casting Brazil into the arms of British imperialism. ⁴ The dissolution of the colonial pact and the political rupture between Brazil and Portugal reflected the global crisis of the Old Regime, serving the expansionist interests of English capitalism. In this context, the Brazilian position on the international economic relations scene may have changed less than one might expect, with the survival of many of the elements that gave meaning to the project of colonial exploration of Portuguese America.

Not to mention slavery, the most decisive of all continuities, which came to assume a central role in Brazil’s economic, political and social life. The topic has of course been discussed thoroughly elsewhere. Here I emphasize only that the economic interests of the slaveholders, on the one hand, and the trauma of the Haitian Revolution on the other were instrumental in unifying scattered sectors of the colonial elite around a project of peaceful political emancipation centered on the figure of D. Pedro I. That is, many of the continuities observed in our independence process were designed to maintain the institution of slavery in the 19th century (?) and beyond.

The mark of these continuities is so profound that they have made our colonial origins the central topic in the historical discussion of Brazilian nationality. Despite the political rupture represented by the independence process, the roots or formation of Brazil would be firmly inscribed in our colonial past, as if the processes of disruption experienced in the centuries following colonization had only reorganized the elementary structures of the economy, society, culture and national political life.

However, this is, in a way, a half-truth, or a reflection of only one particular way of looking at the past. Today’s historians have preferred to highlight the properly revolutionary character of political emancipation, ⁵ taken as a long process, beginning at least in 1808, and ending at least as late as the end of the regency period, in 1840. A process, not a fact, enacted on the 7th of September.

The difference is clear. If there was no bloodshed in the struggles between colonists in favor of independence and Portuguese troops in favor of recolonization, in the immediate context of the “cry of Ipiranga,” the maintenance of the unity of the former colonial group demanded vigorous action from the imperial government established in Rio de Janeiro in the following decades.

For the territorial consolidation of what we now call Brazil, it was necessary to overcome decades of regional upheavals, which were rooted in processes prior to that of political emancipation itself. ⁶ The solution given to the problem of national unity reveals that the independence movement, taken in a broader periodization, was not always peaceful, marked only by continuities. On the contrary, it involved marked episodes of local uprisings, which, in some cases, reached the brink of civil war.

The militarized scene of Pedro Américo’s painting may reflect, in this sense, less the immediate moment he portrays than the many battles fought in subsequent periods.

Independence and the Brazil of the elites

If, from the historiographic point of view, the tension between continuities and discontinuities in the movement that culminated in the independence of Brazil is a matter of perspective, from the political point of view it is also not very different.

This is a controversial subject – not all historians would agree upon attributing to historical subjects an exaggerated responsibility for the course of the processes of which they were part. However, it seems difficult to avoid the evidence that the tenuous balance between permanence and rupture resulted, not by chance, from the capacity of key sectors of colonial Brazil, especially its ruling class, to assert their interests.

It must be made clear that we are not discussing a popular revolution, but a process driven from above, whose essential questions were not necessarily obscure or inescapable. For the colonial elite, the changes and permanences were fundamentally focused on a perspective of the benefits they could obtain with them.

The patriarch José Bonifácio knew this very well, from this knowledge making prudence the motto of his political position, generally favorable to the cause of Independence:

In the reforms there must be good measure of prudence: to know the true state of the times, what they suffer that should be reformed and what should remain. Nothing should be done by leaps, but all by degrees, as in nature. ⁷

It should not be imagined, however, that this “colonial elite” was a homogeneous bloc. On the contrary, within it, the various “parties” faced each other at different moments of the political emancipation process, formulating its ambiguous character.

The “radical liberal” tendency forced a greater rupture, becoming republicanist, but rarely spoke of abolishing slavery. The more “liberal” Brazilian party, at first, defended the maintenance of the status of the United Kingdom, fearing the possible social outbreaks of an openly revolutionary process.

In Portugal, the liberalism of the Courts and the “Portuguese party,” which sought to subject the king to a constitution, was the same that sought to reestablish the old colonial pact, to bring Brazil back under the yoke of exclusive commerce with the metropole, precipitating the union between “radical liberals” and the “Brazilian party.”

Finally, we cannot forget the liberalism of D. Pedro I, around whom pro-independence forces eventually joined, and who would dissolve the Assembly and grant the Constitution of 1824, introducing to the national political scene the Poder Moderador (“Mediative Power”), an authoritarian glimmer embedded in the bosom of a self-proclaimed “liberal” revolution. ⁸

All of these currents bear witness to the ambiguous, precocious influence exerted by liberalism in its many variations: an effective instrument available to elites in the running of national historical processes. Between the extremes of its own ambiguity, it signaled out the changes seen as necessary to be made, and the continuities that had to be shored up.

At the end of the long revolutionary process, which began with the coming of the Portuguese Court in 1808, concluding when the main regional revolts were settled and territorial unity assured, the agrarian and slave elite decisively took the lead in the historical process and built the Brazilian national state in their own image.

The reincarnations of the Patriarch

There is much to discuss about the problem of independence and its implications for national life, but it is of interest here to recover the advice of José Bonifácio and his lasting influence on the modus operandi of the Brazilian elite. ⁹

This refers to, after all, the fifteen years of the illegal slave trade, between 1835 and 1850, when hundreds of thousands of captives entered the country in violation of the law only to be “legalized” by a Judiciary in the firm intention of remaining blind to the corruption of slave owners, while treating all black people as criminally suspect. ¹⁰

A similar process to land ownership, in which illegal appropriations of vast tracts of public lands were amnestied by the Land Act of 1850, approved to a large extent by the rural landowners who benefited from it. ¹¹

In the period immediately following the completion of Independence or Death!, at the time of the proclamation of the Republic in 1889, the smooth transition to the new regime was led by military leaders, who were trusted by the emperor himself. Another revolution “from above,” witnessed by the supposedly “bestialized” people. ¹²

Again, a half-truth. The abolitionist movement had attracted supporters from the most diverse segments of society and gathered crowds in rallies in the largest urban centers of the country. It was the embryo of a new political culture, which spilled out from salons onto the streets.

The Vintém Uprising, a fireproof for the imperial government, transformed the public squares of Rio de Janeiro into arenas of often violent conflict, with the burning of trams and barricades, in protest of fare increases. ¹³ The episode was a yellow light.

The agonizing empire, which had already lost support from a substantial part of an elite who felt betrayed by the end of slavery, was ended “without shocks” by those who defended it, before the opposition came for the monarchy. Thus instructed the patriarch’s prudence.

Examples multiply in the course of national history. Getúlio Vargas had been Minister of Finance under Washington Luís before heading up the “revolution” of 1930. Fifteen years later, once democracy had been overthrown and reconfigured, he would be replaced by Eurico Dutra, minister of the Army during the Vargas regime, who would be elected thanks to the support of the former dictator.

Also in the name of prudence, in 1961, the resignation of Jânio Quadros and the imminent installation of his vice president, João Goulart, was the necessary occasion for presidentialism to be transformed into parliamentarism, with the swoop of a pen. When the change was rejected by the popular vote, they rejected their own suffrage, in another self-proclaimed “revolution,” orchestrated to avoid “shocks.”

Two decades later, Tancredo Neves himself, a former prime minister, articulated with the military regime a “slow, gradual and secure” transition, opening the path for redemocratization that many sought as an opportunity to rewrite the history of the country.

And, in a way, the recent democratic experience has stimulated advances that have rewritten much of our history, until abruptly interrupted, in the course of a rupture ill-concealed as normal. The patriarch, it seems, has many reincarnations.

None of this means that there have not been popular revolts, neither is it intended to diminish the importance of the many slave revolts of the nineteenth century, of the workers’ movements in the twentieth, or of the powerful vocalization of minorities at the beginning of the twenty-first. Nor does it mean that we have not seen any progress in the field of popular interests.

What is disturbing is not the so-called “absence of people,” as so many interpreters of national political life wanted, but the capacity of the Brazilian elite to continually stifle popular movements and regain control over the paths of our history. And, whenever possible, to leave the impression that everything went smoothly, as if by nature.

Desdito

The period of Independence, portrayed by Pedro Américo in Independência ou Morte!, and the time of the proclamation of the Republic, which by chance coincided with the painting’s first exhibition, are emblematic of what is being said here. Striking episodes of national political life, led on a short leash by the Brazilian elite, in order to guarantee for themselves the most advantageous balance between ruptures and continuities.

Desdito [Disavowed] appears in time not very different from these historical events. We are not facing a revolution, and it seems that we will not change our political regime either, but it seems clear that we live the effects of those same old devices, inspired by José Bonifácio and his sense of opportunity.

That is not simply to say that history repeats itself, because we have not yet reached the end of this episode. But if there is anything disconcertingly repetitive in this history it is the agenda of the Brazilian elite and the subterfuges they cast. From this point of view, it’s truly lamentable.

The performance that inspired this book begins with the idea that it is necessary to unsay, disavow, what is always being said: Pedro Américo’s painting, which fixes in the national memory a fictionally heroic event, and the Anthem of Independence, which in being played so many times ends up sounding farcical. With luck, this can help us to unsay, to disavow the Patriarch’s advice, which never ceases to echo throughout our history.

This text was originally published in the book where is pedro américo? (museu do louvre pau-brazyl, 2018) and revised in June 2021.

1
COSTA, Wilma Peres. “A independência na historiografia brasileira”. In JANCSÓ, I. (ed.). Independência: história e historiografia. São Paulo: Hucitec/Fapesp, 2005, p. 53-118. ↩︎
2
PRADO JR., Caio. Evolução política do Brasil. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 2006, p. 47. ↩︎
3
HOLANDA, Sérgio Buarque de. “A herança colonial – sua desagregação”. In:______. (org). História geral da civilização brasileira t.II v.1: o processo de emancipação. São Paulo: Difel, 1962, p.09-39. DIAS, Maria Odila da Silva. “A interiorização da metrópole (1808-1853)”. In: MOTA, Carlos Guilherme (org.). 1822: dimensões. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1972, p.160-184. ↩︎
4
NOVAIS, Fernando A. & MOTA, Carlos G. A independência política do Brasil. São Paulo: Moderna, 1986. COSTA, Emília Viotti da. “Introdução ao estudo da emancipação política”. In: MOTA, C. G. (org.). Brasil em perspectiva. 19ª ed. São Paulo: Difel, 1990. ↩︎
5
On the debate over the theme of revolution in the historiography on independence, see PIMENTA, João Paulo G. A independência do Brasil como uma revolução: história e atualidade de um tema clássico. História da Historiografia, n. 03. Ouro Preto: setembro de 2009, p. 53-82. ↩︎
6
HOLANDA, Sérgio Buarque de. História geral da civilização brasileira t.II, v.2: dispersão e unidade. São Paulo: Difel, 1964. ↩︎
7
SILVA, José Bonifácio de Andrada e. Projetos para o Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, Publifolha, 2000. ↩︎
8
More about the political movement around the Independence in PRADO JR, 2006. p. 45 a 89 e NOVAIS & MOTA, 1986, p. 37-65. ↩︎
9
The central argument of this essay benefits itself from differents readings, like the classical from the Brazilian social thouhgt as Raimundo Faoro, as recent contributions like Jessé de Souza. FAORO, Raymundo. Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro. São Paulo: Globo, 2008. SOUZA, Jessé. A elite do atraso: da escravidão à Lava Jato. Rio de Janeiro, Leya, 2017. ↩︎
10
CHALHOUB, Sidney. A força da escravidão: ilegalidade e costume no Brasil oitocentista. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012. ↩︎
11
SILVA, Ligia Osório. Terras Devolutas e Latifúndio. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2008. ↩︎
12
CARVALHO. José Murilo de. Os bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987. ↩︎
13
GRAHAM, Sandra L. O motim do vintém e a cultura política do Rio de Janeiro, 1880. Revista Brasileira de História, 20, 1991, p. 211-232. ↩︎

Andrej Slivnik is a student on the Master’s degree program in History at Unicamp and holds a degree in Economics, from the same university. Since 2011, he has advised federal and state public agencies on issues related to the elaboration and evaluation of employment policies and labor relations, social security and economic development. He currently conducts research on two fronts. Within History, he explores the origins of Brazilian social security policy and its interconnections with the social challenges of republican Brazil. In economics, he discusses the role and the history of public financial institutions in promoting development. He was columnist of Rumos magazine in 2017.

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independence in three periods